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A Note on Testing “Tax-and-Spend, Spend-and-Tax or   
Fiscal Synchronization”: The Case of China 
 




The hypothesis of tax-and-spend, spend-and-tax, or fiscal synchronization was tested using 
annual time series data for China over the period 1977 to 1999. We include GDP as a control 
variable into the model like Baghestani and Mcnown (1994), Koren and Stiassny (1998), and 
Chang  et al. (2002). The results from Granger causality test based on the corresponding 
multivariate error-correction models (MVECM) suggest feedback between government revenues 





Owing to the great concern over the growing budget deficits, numerous studies have 
been devoted to testing the “Tax-and-Spend, Spend-and-Tax, or Fiscal Synchronization” 
hypothesis. The determination of which hypothesis characterizes an economy is more than an 
intellectual exercise and has implications about solutions to the problem of budget deficits. 
For country-specific studies, see, for example, Anderson et al. (1986), Von Furstenberg et al. 
(1986), Miller and Russek (1990), and Baghestani and Mconwn (1994) for the US study; 
Hasan and Ian (1997) for the UK study; Payne (1997) for the Canadian study; Darrat (1998) 
for the Turkey study; Li (2001) for the China study; and Chang and Ho (2002) for the 
Taiwan study. In the case of multi-country studies, see, Ram (1998a, 1988b), Baffes and 
Shah (1994), and Chang et al. (2002). However, the empirical evidence in testing the validity 
of these hypotheses has led to inconclusive results. 
While previous studies focus most on the industrial and developing countries, this note 
attempts to make some contributions to this line of research by using recent time series 
econometric techniques to test the “Tax-and-Spend, Spend-and-Tax, or Fiscal Synchronization” 
hypothesis in the case of China. The data set used here consists of annual time series on real 
GDP (1995 = 100), real government revenues, and real government expenditures covering 
period 1977-1999. First of all, standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller, KPSS, and Zivot-Andrew 
(1992) tests are applied to examine the time series properties of the GDP, government 
revenue, and government expenditure variables. The tests reveal that all variables in 
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logarithmic form have unit roots. The Johansen’s multivariate cointegration test is 
subsequently used to examine whether there exists a long-run equilibrium relationship 
among these three variables. It suggests that these three variables are cointegrated with one 
vector. Finally, the Granger causality results based on the corresponding multivariate 
error-correction models (MVECM) suggest feedback between real government revenues and 
real government expenditures, supporting the “Fiscal Synchronization” hypothesis for China. 
This note is organized as follows: Section II briefly describes the fiscal system in 
China over the past two decades. Section III presents the data used. Section IV describes the 
methodology employed and the empirical findings were discussed. Finally, Section V 
presents the conclusions. 
 
II. Brief Description of China’s Fiscal System 
 
Before 1979, China’s fiscal system was characterized by centralized revenue collection 
and centralized fiscal transfers, that is, most taxes and profits were collected by local 
governments and were remitted to the central government, and then in part transferred back 
to the local governments according to expenditures needs approved by the center. 
In 1979, China started market-oriented economic reform. The tax reform is an 
important part of economic reform, which is aimed at providing state enterprise production 
incentives, cutting off fiscal dependence of state enterprises on government, equalizing tax 
burdens among enterprises, and promoting fair competition. According to Lin (2000), the tax 
reforms experienced the following five stages in China. Stage 1, the central government 
allows state enterprises to keep some profits and this major fiscal reform started in China 
since 1979; Stage 2, the success of these experiments in stage 1 encouraged the government 
to pursue further fiscal system reform in 1983. At this stage, a reform commonly called 
substituting taxes for profits was occurred; Stage 3, the contract responsibility system (CRS) 
was introduced on the basis of substituting taxes for profits in December 1986 (details about 
CRS see Lin (2000)); Stage 4, facing decline government revenues, a tax plus profit system 
was launched in 1989 to increase government revenues; and Stage 5, a new tax system called 
tax-sharing system was established in 1994. Several significant changes in the tax system 
took place at this stage (details about these tax reforms in China see Lin (2000)). 
In sum, the fiscal system in China is characterized by the sharing of tax revenues. 
Under this system, the scopes of expenditures of governments at different levels are 
determined by their respective responsibilities budgets are managed separately by 
governments at different levels. The central government budget is approved by the national 
people’s congress (NPC) and the local government budgets are approved by the people’s 
congresses at the local levels. Budgets at the local and central level are divided into current 
items and capital or construction items. Current expenditure items include expenditure for 
social development and welfare and expenditures for national defense, armed policies, and 
administration. On the revenues side, current revenues, primary taxes, made up 96% of total 
revenues. 




In this empirical note we use annual data on real GDP (rgdp), real government 
revenues (rgr) and real government expenditures (rge) for China over the 1977 to 1999 
period (deflated by GDP deflator, 1995 = 100). All the data used in this note are taken from 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics (lines 81, 82, and 99b, respectively for government 
revenue, government expenditure and GDP). Examination of the individual data series make 
it clear that the logarithmic transformations were required to achieve stationarity in variance; 
therefore, all the data series were transformed to logarithmic form. A cursory review of the 
data reveals that the revenue-to-GDP and expenditure-to-GDP ratios both declined from 
about 32% in 1978 to about 11% in 1999, respectively. The deficit-to-GDP ratios are about 
0.6% to 1.5% during this time period.
1 Upon closer examination, it shows that government 
budget deficits have continuously increased in China since 1988 (details about the reasons of 
these increasing budget deficits, see Luo and Golembiewski (1996), Ma (1997), Lin (2000)). 
The persistence and growing size of budget deficits have caused much concern to economists 
and Chinese policy-makers. 
 
IV. Methodology and Empirical Results 
 
1. Unit Root Tests 
 
A number of authors have pointed out that the standard ADF test is not appropriate for 
the variables that may have undergone structural changes.
2 For example, Perron (1989, 
1990) and Zivot and Andrews (1992) have shown that the existence of structural changes 
biases the standard ADF tests towards nonrejection of the null of unit root. Hence, it might 
be incorrect to conclude that the variables are nonstationary on the basis of the results using 
the standard ADF tests. Perron (1990) developed a procedure for testing the hypothesis that a 
given series  } { t Y  has a unit root with an exogenous structural break occurs at time  B T . 
Zivot and Andrews (1992, hereafter ZA) criticized this assumption of an exogenous break 
point and developed a unit-root test procedure that allows an estimated break in the trend 
function under the alternative hypothesis. Therefore, it seems appropriate to treat the 
structural break as endogenous and test the order of integration by the ZA procedure. The ZA 
tests are represented by the following augmented regression equations: 
 
 
1. According to Luo and Golembiewski (1996), in the Chinese calculation, a budget deficit equaled expenditures 
minus the sum of debt disbursements and current revenues. In other words, in China, debt disbursements 
constituted revenues rather a means of financing deficits. As a result, the officially published deficits were much 
smaller than the ones calculated by the method accepted by most countries. 
2.  The sample period for our data starts from 1977 to 1999, covered the second times oil-price shock and the 
Mainland China’s economic reform period, we expect that there might exist structural breaks for data series 
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where  1 = t DU  and  B t T t DT - =
*  if  B T t > and 0 otherwise. Here  B T  refers to a possible 
break point. Model A allows for a change in the level of the series, Model B allows for a 
change in the slope of the trend function, and Model C combines changes in the level and the 
slope of the trend function of the series.
3 The sequential ADF test procedure estimates a 
regression equation for every possible break point within the sample and calculates the 
t-statistic for the estimated coefficients. This tests the null hypothesis of a unit root against 
the alternative hypothesis of a trend stationarity with a one-time break ( B T ) in the intercept 
and slope of the trend function at unknown point in time. The null of a unit root is rejected if 
the coefficient of  1 - t Y   is significantly different from zero. The selected break point for each 
data series is that  B T  for which the t-statistic for the null is minimized. Since the choice of 
lag length  k  may affect the test results, the lag length is selected according to the procedure 
suggested by Perron (1989) with  4 max = k . 
For comparison purpose, we also incorporate standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)) tests into our study. Panel A and B in Table 1 
report the results of non-stationary tests for real GDP (lrgdp), real government revenues 
(lrgr), and real government expenditures (lrge) using both ADF and KPSS tests.   
 
Table 1  ADF and KPSS Unit Root Tests 
  Panel A: ADF  Panel B: KPSS ( ) m h  
  Level  Difference  Level  Difference 
lrgdp  0.871 (1)  2.728
** (1)  1.192
* [1]  0.198 [1] 
lrgr  0.798 (1)  3.202
* (1)  0.857
* [1]  0.050 [1] 
lrge  0.755 (1)  3.468
* (1)  0.885
* [1]  0.257 [1] 
Note: 1. The number in the parenthesis indicates the selected lag order of the ADF model. Lags were chosen based 
on Perron’s (1989) method. 




** indicate significance at 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
4. Critical values for KPSS are taken from Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). 
5. Critical values are 0.347 and 0.463 for 10% and 5%, respectively, for KPSS test. 
6. Critical values are  2.645 and  3.011 for 10% and 5%, respectively, for the ADF test. 
 
3. When the coefficients of both dummy variables are not significantly different from zero, Model C reduces to the 
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We find each data series is nonstationary in levels and stationary in first differences, 
suggesting that all the data series are integrated of order one. Table 2 reports the minimum 
t-statistics that correspond to Model C.   
 
Table 2   Zivot-Andrews Unit Root Tests for One Break 
  Model  Break  ) ˆ ( inf l t  
lrgdp  C  1987  3.672 
lrgr  C  1989  4.012 
lrge  C  1992  4.422 
Note: 1. Model specification (i.e., which model, A, B, or C, is appropriate) is determined by first running each data 
series on Model C, with the possibility of both a slope and a level break. Model C is chosen if both dummy 
variables are significant. If only the slope dummy variable is significant, Model B is estimated. If only the 
level dummy is significant, Model A is estimated. 
2. Critical values are taken from Zivot and Andrew (1992). The 10% and 5% critical values are  4.82 and 
5.08, respectively, for Model C. 
 
The test results summarized from Table 2 provide evidence for the existence of a unit root 
when breaks are allowed. The test results are identical to those of the standard ADF and 
KPSS tests reported in Table 1 suggesting that all the data series are integrated of order one, 
even when breaks are allowed. The plausible breaks for the series occur at 1987, 1989, and 
1992, respectively, for real GDP, real government revenues, and real government 
expenditures. On the basis of these results, we proceed to test whether these three variables 
are cointegrated using the Johansen method. 
 
2. Cointegration Tests 
 
Following Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990), we construct a 
p-dimensional (3 x 1) vector autoregressive model with Gaussian errors being expressed by 
its first-differenced error correction form as 
 
t t k t k t t t Y Y Y Y Y e m+ + P - D G + + D G + D G = D - + - - - - 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 K ,                        (2) 
 
where  t Y  are data series studied,  t e   is i.i.d. N(0, S ),  i i A A A I + + + + - = G ... 2 1 , for 
1 , , 2 , 1 - = k i K  a nd  k A A A I - - - - = P K 2 1 . The  P matrix conveys information about 
the long-run relationship between  t Y  variables, and the rank of  P is the number of linearly 
independent and stationary linear combinations of variables studied. Thus, testing for 
cointegration involves testing for the rank of  P matrix  r  by examining whether the 
eigenvalues of  P are significantly different from zero. 
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) propose two test statistics for 
testing the number of cointegrating vectors (or the rank of  P): the trace ( r T ) and the 
maximum eigenvalue (L-max) statistics. The likelihood ratio statistic for the trace test is 
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, 1 + are estimated  r p -  smallest eigenvalues. 
The null hypothesis to be tested is that there are at most  r  cointegrating vectors. That 
is, the number of cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to  r , where  r  is 0, 1, or 2. In 
each case, the null hypothesis is tested against the general alternative. 
Alternatively, the L-max statistic is 
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)
.                                               (4) 
 
In this test, the null hypothesis of  r  cointegrating vectors is tested against the 
alternative of  1 + r  cointegrating vectors. Thus, the null hypothesis  0 = r  is tested against 
the alternative that  1 = r ,  1 = r  against the alternative  2 = r , and so forth. 
It is well known that Johansen‘s cointegration tests are very sensitive to the choice of 
lag length. Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) was used to select the number of lags 
required in the cointegration test.
4 A VAR model is first fit to the data to find an appropriate 
lag structure. The Schwartz Information Criterion (SC) suggests 1 lag for our VAR model. 
Table 3 presents the results from the Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Jueslius (1990) 
cointegration test. According to Cheung and Lai (1993), the Trace test shows more 
robustness to both skewness and excess kurtosis in the residuals than the L -max test; 
therefore, we use only Trace statistics in our study.   
 
Table 3   Cointegration Tests Based on the Johansen (1988) and   
         Johansen and Juselius (1990) Approach (VAR lag = 1) 
  Trace Test  5% Critical Value  10% Critical Value 
0 : 0 = r H   36.07
*  29.68  26.79 
1 : 0 £ r H   11.61  15.41  13.33 
2 : 0 £ r H   0.55  3.76  2.69 
Note: 1. Critical values are taken from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
2. r denote the number of cointegrating vectors. 
3. Schwarzt Information Criteria (SIC) was used to select the number of lags required in the cointegrating test. 
The computed Ljung-Box Q-statistics indicate that the residuals are white noise. 
4. 
* indicates significance at the 5% level. 
 
As shown in this table, Trace statistic suggests that there exists one cointegrating vector 
among these three variables. This result suggests that these three variables would not move 
 
4. Using Monte Carlo simulations, Cheung and Lai (1993) show that for autoregressive process standard selection 
criteria, like the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), can be useful for 
selecting the correct lag structure for the Johansen’s cointegration test. They found that the SIC performs slightly 
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too far away from each other, displaying a comovement phenomenon for the real GDP, real 
government revenues, and real government expenditures in China over this sample period. 
 
3. Granger-Causality Results Based on Error-Correction Model (ECM) 
 
Granger (1988) points out that if there exists a cointegrating vector among variables, 
there must be causality among these variables at least in one direction. Granger (1986) and 
Engle and Granger (1987) provide a test of causality that takes into account information 
provided by the cointegrated properties of variables. The model can be expressed as an 
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where  it Y   denotes real GDP, real government revenues, or real government expenditures. 
1 - ¢ t Z b  contains  r  cointegrating terms, reflecting the long-run equilibrium relationship 
among variables. Form the system, the Granger-causality tests are examined by testing 
whether all the coefficients of  i t Y - D , 2   or  i t Y - D , 3  are statistically different from zero as a 
group based on a standard F-test and/or the  s b¢   coefficient of the error-correction is also 
significant. Since the Granger-causality tests are very sensitive to the lag length selection, in 
this paper, the lag lengths are determined using Hsiao’s (1979) sequential procedure, which 
is based on the Granger definition of causality and Akaike’s (1974) minimum final 
prediction error (FPE) criterion. This procedure is known as the stepwise Granger-causality 
technique, which provides a statistical criterion for choosing the optimum lag length using 
past information. Thornton and Batten (1985) have found Hsiao’s method to be superior to 
both arbitrary lag length selection and several systematic procedures for determining lag 
length. 
Table 4 reports the results from Granger causality tests based on the corresponding 
multivariate error-correction models (MVECM). Several interesting findings are to be noted. 
 
Table 4   Granger Causality Results Based on Parsimonious Vector Error-correction 
Models (VECM) 
(A)     
dlrgr [1]  dlrge [1] 
dlrge [1]  dlrgr [1]  Feedback between Real GR and Real GE 
(B)     
dlrgr [1]  dlrgdp [1] 
dlrgdp [1]  dlrgr [1]  Real GDP Granger causes Real GR 
(C)     
dlrge [1]  dlrgdp [1] 
dlrgdp [1]  dlrge [1] 
Real GDP Granger causes Real GE 
Note: Number in the parenthesis was selected by using Akaike’s (1974) Final Prediction Error (FPE) criterion. 
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First, we find bi-directional feedback between real government revenues and real government 
expenditures. This empirical result supports the “Fiscal Synchronization” hypothesis 
indicates that tax and spending decisions are made simultaneously by the fiscal authority for 
China over this sample period. This result is in agreement with our expectation about the 
China’s fiscal system that we mentioned earlier in this note. The major implication that we 
draw from our result is that to attack the problem of continuously increasing budget deficits, 
the government of China should be cautions, as pointed by Manage and Marlow (1986) 
simply raising revenue, cutting expenditures, or simply changing both sides without taking 
into account of the interdependence between the two, may be ambiguous in their impacts on 
fiscal situation in China. Our empirical finding is quite consistent with those found in Li 
(2001) for China study. However, our result is inconsistent with those found in Chang and 
Ho (2002) for Taiwan study and Chang et al. (2002) for a panel of 7 industrial countries and 
3 newly industrialized countries study, they find unidirectional Granger causality running 
from government revenues to government expenditures for most countries studied. This 
difference may well reflect the different fiscal system used in China from those of other 
countries (see, Ma  (1997), Luo and Golembiewski  (1996), Lin (2000), and Li (2001)). 
Second, we find unidirectional Granger causality running from real GDP to real government 
expenditures. This result is in agreement with the view of Wagner (1890) states that as the 
economy grows there exists a tendency for government activities to increase. However, this 
result is inconsistent with the view of Keynesian states that fiscal policy stimulates economic 
growth. In fact, a big country, such as China, with abundant resources we would expect some 
other economic factors which affect its own economic growth. Third, we also find 
unidirectional Granger causality running from real GDP to real government revenues. This 





In this not, we use cointegration analysis and a vector autoregressive model (VAR) to 
test the “Tax-and-Spend, Spend-and-Tax, or Fiscal Synchronization“ hypothesis for China 
using annual time-series data over the period 1977 to 1999. Our study improves upon 
research in this area in several respects. First, previous studies focus most on developing and 
developed countries and not too many have been done on the centrally planned economy of 
China. In addition, we use a more comprehensive MVECM framework with GDP as a 
control variable into the model like Baghestani and Mcnown (1994), Koren and Stiassny 
(1998), and Chang et al. (2002). Our application of Johansen (1988) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990) cointegration test indicates that there exists one cointegrating vector among 
real GDP, real government revenues, and real government expenditures for China over this 
sample period. The results from Granger causality test based on the corresponding 
multivariate error-correction models (MVECM) suggest a feedback exists between 
government revenues and government expenditures, supporting the “Fiscal Synchronization” 
hypothesis for China over this sample period. 
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